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Freethought Society of Greater Philadelphia v. Chester
County: The Desirability of a De Minimis Exception
to the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence
In Freethought Society of Greater Philadelphia v. Chester
County, the Third Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a display of
the Ten Commandments on the facade of the Chester County,
Pennsylvania courthouse. The court held that the County's refusal to
take down the plaque was not motivated by a desire to endorse
religion, but rather by a desire to "preserve a longstanding plaque."
It also stated that the plaque was not a "real threat" to separation of
church and state, thus invoking the spirit of the legal maxim "de
minimis non curat lex" or "the law does not bother with trifles." This
article examines the Freethought decision and concludes that it
reached an incorrect result by misapplying both tests used by courts
to decide Establishment Clause cases. The Third Circuit confused
"history" and "context" in its endorsement test analysis and attributed
extremely unrealistic knowledge to the reasonable observer used in
the endorsement test. It also did not fully apply the Lemon test.
Comparison with Ten Commandments cases in other circuits
underscores the Third Circuit's errors. Finally, the article investigates
the use of the legal maxim "de minimis non curat lex" and determines
that the maxim should not be applied in Establishment Clause cases
because it is incongruous with the purpose of the Bill of Rights.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 2003, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
announced its decision in Glassroth v. Moore.' Finding Alabama
Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy Moore's installation of a 5,280-
pound granite monument of the Ten Commandments in the rotunda
of Alabama State Judicial Building to be a violation of the
Establishment Clause, the court upheld an order requiring the
monument's removal. The decision was the focus of considerable
media scrutiny, fueled by the feelings of many that the court was
trying to destroy the "moral foundation of [the] law."2 Protestors
assembled in front of the judicial building, refusing to leave and
threatening to block any attempt to move the monument.3 The saga
was yet another reminder of the controversy engendered by court
decisions dealing with religious symbols in public places.4
Copyright 2005, by LOUISIANA LAW REviEW.
1. 335 F.3d 1282 (1 1th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1000, 124 S. Ct.
497 (2003).
2. Manuel Roig-Franzia, Jurist Defies Deadline on Monument, Washington
Post, Aug. 21, 2003, at AOL.
3. Id.
4. Other examples of controversial Establishment Clause cases involving
religious symbols include County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 109 S. Ct.
3086 (1989) (holding display of creche to violate Establishment Clause, while
finding display of menorah constitutional) and Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
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Just days before the Eleventh Circuit handed down its decision in
Glassroth, the Third Circuit ruled on another case involving the Ten
Commandments. In Freethought Society of Greater Philadelphia v.
Chester County,5 the court upheld the constitutionality of the display
of a plaque of the Ten Commandments on the facade of the Chester
County courthouse. Unlike Glassroth, there was no public uproar or
extensive media coverage. However, Freethought is the more
significant case from a legal perspective. This article examines the
Freethought decision and evaluates how the Third Circuit reached its
decision. Part I presents a brief overview of the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. This section will establish that
in deciding an Establishment Clause case, courts must look to both
the Lemon6 test and the endorsement test as articulated by Justice
O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly7 and County ofAllegheny v. ACLU.8
Part II examines Freethought's facts and discusses the Court's
reasoning for finding the display constitutional. Part III argues that
the court misapplied both Establishment Clause tests. The court
failed to distinguish between "history" and "context" in its
endorsement test analysis, charged the "reasonable observer" with far
too much knowledge, and overextended the holding of a prior
Establishment Clause case, Marsh v. Chambers.9 Part IV suggests
that the underlying reason for the court's decision was that it believed
the display to be a de minimis violation of the Establishment Clause
which did not merit the attention of the court. Part IV further
examines the legal maxim "de minimis non curat lex," and its use in
the constitutional context. This section will show that the maxim has
occasionally been utilized by courts, and that the Supreme Court has
at least hinted at its use. Part V concludes that a de minimis
exception should not be created in order to avoid making difficult
decisions regarding the meaning of the Establishment Clause and that
such an exception would be incompatible with the purpose of the Bill
of Rights.
I. HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
The problem of reaching a consistent approach to resolving
Establishment Clause ° cases has plagued the Supreme Court for
104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (upholding constitutionality of display of creche).
5. 334 F.3d 247 (3rd Cir. 2003) (cert. not sought).
6. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971).
7. 465 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
8. 492 U.S. 573, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
9. 463 U.S. 783, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
10. The Establishment Clause, which is contained in the First Amendment,
2004]
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decades. After only deciding one case in the nineteenth century
under the Establishment Clause, Bradfield v. Roberts," the Court
spent much time in the twentieth century trying to determine the
clause's meaning.'" Recent decisions, such as Lynch v. Donnelly
3
and County of Allegheny v. ACLU,14 illustrate a Court deeply
divided as to what government action is impermissible under the
Establishment Clause. While a full review of the Court's extensive
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is outside of the scope of this
casenote, an examination of the two major tests 5 which have
emerged from those cases is necessary in order to understand how
the Third Circuit erred in Freethought.
A. The Lemon Test
While it has taken a number of different directions on the
meaning of the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court achieved
a modicum of consistency in Establishment Clause jurisprudence
for about twenty years by utilizing the test developed in Lemon v.
Kurtzman16 in 1971.17 The Lemon test is actually a combination of
the criteria used to decide Establishment Clause cases in the years
leading up to the Lemon decision. 8 In order to pass constitutional
scrutiny under Lemon, a government action must have a secular
legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that
reads "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ... "
U.S. Const. amend. I. The Establishment Clause was made applicable to the states
via the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
11. 175 U.S. 291, 20 S. Ct. 121 (1899).
12. See generally Francis Graham Lee, Wall of Controversy-Church-State
Conflict in America (1986).
13. 465 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
14. 492 U.S. 573,109 S. Ct 3086 (1989).
15. While Lemon and the endorsement test continue to be the most commonly
used tests in Establishment Clause cases, several others have also been utilized.
The coercion test, which Justice Kennedy introduced in Allegheny, was later
adopted by the majority in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 112 S. Ct 2649 (1992).
Under the coercion test, the government is prevented from coercing anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise. Id at 587. Also, the Supreme
Court's holding in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983),
which held legislative prayer to be constitutional because the practice existed at the
time of the First Congress, is frequently cited. Marsh is discussed in more detail
later in this paper.
16. 403 U.S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971).
17. Jon Veen, Note, Where Do We Go From Here? The Need for Consistent
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 52 Rutgers L. Rev. 1195 (2000).
18. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612, 91 S. Ct. at 2111 (citing Walz v. Tax
Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668, 90 S. Ct. 1409, 1411 (1970); Board of Education
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243, 88 S. Ct. 1923, 1926 (1968)).
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neither advances nor inhibits religion, and there must be no
excessive government entanglement with religion.' 9
In Lemon, the Court was called upon to determine the
constitutionality of two statutes from Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
which provided state aid to nonpublic schools. The Court found that
the statutes had the valid secular purpose of enhancing the quality of
education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws,
thus passing the first prong.20 However, the Court believed that both
statutes created excessive government entanglement with religion
because of the likelihood that teachers in public schools would be
unable to remain neutral towards religion while teaching their
classes. 2' Having failed Lemon's third prong, the statutes were struck
down.
Although Lemon provides a bright-line test for deciding
Establishment Clause cases, it has been vigorously criticized by
judges and scholars alike.22 Over the protests of Justice Brennan, the
Lemon test was strangely ignored in the important Establishment
Clause case of Marsh v. Chambers.23 By the early 1990s, several
members of the Supreme Court had expressed their displeasure with
the test, or certain parts of it. Justice Scalia went as far as to compare
Lemon to a "ghoul in a late-night horror movie" that refuses to go
away despite being "repeatedly killed and buried." 24
Nonetheless, Lemon remains good law. As the Court put it in
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,25
"Lemon, however frightening, has not been overruled., 2 6 The various
circuit courts continue to cite Lemon,27 and until it is overruled, no
Establishment Clause case is properly decided without consideration
of its three prongs.
19. Id.
20. Id. at613,91 S. Ct. at 2 111.
21. Id. at 617, 91 S. Ct. at 2113.
22. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 319, 120 S. Ct. 2266,
2284 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Lemon has had a checkered career in
the decisional law of this court"); see also, Comm. for Pub. Ed. & Religious Liberty
v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671, 100 S. Ct. 840, 856 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(expressing desire to abandon altogether "the sisyphean task of trying to patch
together the 'blurred, indistinct, and invariable barrier' described in Lemon"); Jesse
H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J. L. & Pol. 499,
503 (2002) (referring to Lemon as a "conceptual disaster area").
23. 463 U.S. 783, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
24. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S.
384, 398, 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 395 n.7, 113 S. Ct. at 2148 n.7.
27. For recent cases which utilized the Lemon test, see Glassroth v. Moore, 335
F.3d 1282 (1 1th Cir. 2003) and Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002).
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B. The Endorsement Test
The other major test employed in Establishment Clause cases is the
endorsement test,28 which was first articulated by Justice O'Connor in
her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.2 9 O'Connor presented the
endorsement test as a refinement of the Lemon test. Beginning with the
premise that "the Establishment Clause prohibits government from
making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's
standing in the political community," she explained that government
action directly infringes this command if it either purposefully or
unintentionally has "the effect of communicating a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion."3"
In order to determine whether a particular practice
unconstitutionally endorses religion, O'Connor looked to the
"reasonable observer."3 The relevant inquiry is whether or not a
reasonable observer would perceive the challenged display as a
government endorsement of religion.32 In Capitol Square Review and
Advisory Board v. Pinette,33 O'Connor analogized her reasonable
observer to the reasonable person in tort law. 4 She proposed that the
reasonable observer was a "personification of a community ideal of
reasonable social judgement. 35 Finally, the reasonable observer must
know the "histor and context" of the forum in which the religious
display appears.
Applying the test in Lynch, O'Connor concluded that the City of
Pawtucket's inclusion of a creche in its annual Christmas display was
constitutional.37 The creche was positioned near other secular
Christmas items, such as a Santa Claus, a sleigh, and candy-striped
poles. 38 Key to this finding of constitutionality was her belief that the
secular objects which surrounded the creche, and "the overall holiday
setting," changed what viewers would perceive to be the purpose of the
display.39
28. For a an in-depth discussion of the endorsement test, see Jesse H. Choper,
The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & Pol. 499, 503 (2002).
29. 465 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct 1355 (1984).
30. Id. at 692, 104 S. Ct. at 1369.
31. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779,
115 S. Ct. 2440, 2455 (1995).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 779, 780, 115 S. Ct. at 2455.
34. Id. at 779, 115 S. Ct. at 2455.
35. Id. at 780, 115 S. Ct. at 2455 (citing W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton &
D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 175 (5th ed. 1984).
36. Id.
37. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1370 (1984).
38. Id. at 671, 104 S. Ct. at 1358.
39. Id. at 692, 104 S. Ct at 1369.
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O'Connor used the endorsement test to reach the opposite result
in another case involving a creche. In County of Allegheny v.
ACLU,4' the creche in the County courthouse sat alone, with none of
the secular symbols of Christmas that were present in Lynch. Finding
that "the display of religious symbols in public areas of core
government buildings runs a special risk of making religion relevant,
in reality or public perception, to status in the political community,"
O'Connor found the display unconstitutional. 4 She distinguished
Lynch because the creche in Allegheny stood alone, without any of the
secular objects present in Lynch which prevented the perception of a
government endorsement of religion.42 Thus, O'Connor reiterated the
importance of evaluating the entire setting where the religious symbol
in question was placed.
While the endorsement test has gained adherents over the years,
it, like Lemon, has been subject to considerable criticism. Justice
Stevens delivered a stinging criticism of O'Connor's "reasonable
observer," in his dissent in Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Board v. Pinette.43 He believed that O'Connor charged the
reasonable observer with far too much knowledge, arguing that she
had assumed an "ultrareasonable observer," who was aware of "the
vagaries of this Court's First Amendment jurisprudence."' Stevens
instead believed that "[f]or a religious display to violate the
Establishment Clause, I think it is enough that some reasonable
observers would attribute a religious message to the State.,
45
In sum, the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence
is far from clear. Due to the multitude of tests which have been
developed, lower courts struggle to find the proper framework for
deciding the Establishment Clause cases which come before them.
While a single, uniform test would provide much needed clarity, the
Court seems unlikely to develop one in the near future. Thus, lower
courts are left with no choice but to continue applying the Lemon and
endorsement tests.
11. THE FREETHOUGHT DECISION: FACTS AND ANALYSIS
A. The Facts of Freethought
In 1920, the Chester County Commissioners accepted a bronze
plaque displaying a Protestant version of the Ten Commandments
40. 492 U.S. 573, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
41. Id. at 626, 109 S. Ct. at 3119.
42. Id.
43. 515 U.S. 753, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
44. Id. at 807, 115 S. Ct. at 2469.
45. Id., 115 S. Ct. at 2470.
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from an organization known as the Religious Education Council.46 A
dedication ceremony was held, at which both religious and secular
themes were mentioned.47 Judge Frank E. Hause delivered the
following admonition to those in attendance: "Have you remembered
the Sabbath Day, to keep it holy? If you disobey the commandments
here and escape punishment, there is yet the punishment which will
surely be meted out on the day of judgment."4 Hause also stated that
"with very few exceptions, every statute on our books can be traced to
the Ten Commandments, which are the foundation stone of all civilized
countries., 49 The plaque, which was over four feet tall and over three
feet wide, was then affixed near what was then the entrance to the
courthouse.50
The plaque largely sat alone on the facade of the courthouse. The
only other plaques nearby were a no skateboarding sign, a sign noting
that the building was on the National Register of Historical places, and
some plaques concerning courtroom hours." The plaque sat next to the
historic entrance of the courthouse, although that entrance was closed
for security reasons.5" The title "The Ten Commandments" was legible
to a passerby on the sidewalk, although the court stated that visitors
have "no reason to go there. 53 Also, there was testimony that the area
near the plaque was sometimes used for public gatherings, such as
political rallies.' 4
In 2001, Sally Flynn, an atheist and member of the Freethought
Society of Greater Philadelphia, filed suit after the Chester County
Commissioners denied her request to have the plaque removed.55 Flynn
alleged that the plaque violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment because it amounted to the endorsement of religion by the
County. 56 The County asserted that the long history of the plaque and
the fact that the County had not taken any action to highlight or
celebrate the plaque since its placement, changed the overall effect of
the plaque so that when it was viewed in context, a reasonable observer
would not perceive it to be a government endorsement of religion.57





50. Id. at 254.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 253-54.
53. Id. at 250.
54. Id. at 254.
55. Id. at 255. The Freethought Society is a "forum for atheists, agnostics, and




B. The Third Circuit's Analysis
After explaining the development of the endorsement test, the
court set out to apply it. It first noted that "the history and ubiquity"
of a practice was relevant because it provides part of the context in
which a reasonable observer evaluates whether a government practice
conveys a message which endorses religion. The court continued by
acknowledging the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Stone v.
Graham that "the Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text
in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a
supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact."59 Arguing that
such symbols do not exist in a vacuum, however, the court
emphasized context.6 ° Seizing on O'Connor's statement that history
should be considered in evaluating context, 61 the court proclaimed
that "the age and history of the plaque provide[s] a context which
changes the effect of an otherwise historical plaque. 62
The court then looked to whether a reasonable observer would
view the plaque as the County's endorsement of religion. Recalling
the history of the plaque, the court concluded that the reasonable
observer would view the plaque as a "reminder of past events in
Chester County. "63 According to the court, the reasonable observer
would not see an endorsement of religion, but rather a desire on the
part of the County to preserve a longstanding plaque.64 The court also
presumed that the reasonable observer would know that "the County
has not held a ceremony to commemorate the anniversary of the
plaque, or even installed lights to draw attention to the plaque at
night."65
Concluding its endorsement analysis, the court stated that the
issue was "best framed" by Marsh v. Chambers, a Supreme Court
decision which upheld the constitutionality of Nebraska's practice of
legislative prayer.66 The court found it significant that "the Supreme
Court has acknowledged the proposition that history can transform
the effect of religious practice. ' 6?
58. 449 U.S. 39, 101 S. Ct. 192 (1980).
59. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 262 (quoting Stone, 449 U.S. at 41, 101 S. Ct. at
194).
60. Id.
61. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630, 109 S. Ct. 3086,
3121 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
62. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 264.
63. Id. at 265.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 266.





The court then turned to its analysis under the test set forth in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.68 After noting that Lemon had been severely
criticized, the court acknowledged that Lemon might be utilized by
the Supreme Court upon review and therefore, proceeded to analyze
the case under that framework.69 The court began by considering the
first prong of the test, which requires a secular purpose for the
challenged government action. Looking to testimony at the trial court
level, the court believed the County's assertion that the purpose of
maintaining the plaque was to represent the "'two wing theory of our
polity' in which faith and reason worked together to create and
maintain the American experiment."70
After completing the first prong of the Lemon test, the court
declined to continue with an analysis under the other two prongs.
Instead, it stated that "effect under the Lemon test is cognate to
endorsement" and simply declared that the County commissioner's
refusal to remove the plaque "passes constitutional muster under both
the purpose and effect prongs of Lemon."" The court concluded its
opinion by conveying its belief that the plaque in question did not, in
the words of Justice Goldberg, present a "real threat" of establishing
a religion, but was rather a "mere shadow."72  There were no
dissenting opinions.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE FREETHOUGHT DECISION
The Third Circuit's opinion in Freethought is troubling because
it did not comport with the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. It misapplied the endorsement test, paid mere lip
service to applying the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, and
overextended the narrow holding of Marsh v. Chambers. A point-by-
point breakdown of the court's analysis is useful in revealing the
inadequacy of the court's decision.
A. The Freethought Court Misapplied the Endorsement Test
1. The court failed to distinguish between "history" and
"context" in conducting its endorsement analysis
There are numerous problems with the court's endorsement
analysis. Although it cited Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
68. 403 U.S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971).
69. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 261.
70. Id. at 267 (quoting Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 191 F. Supp. 2d
589, 598 (E.D. Pa. 2002)).
71. Id. at 269.
72. Id. at 270.
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Allegheny as support for its position,73 the court apparently did not
consider the remarkable similarity between Allegheny and
Freethought. Both cases involved an unquestionably religious
symbol on display in a government building. In both cases, the
religious symbol stood alone, with no secular objects to distract from
the symbol's religious impression. The similarities should have
required the Third Circuit to reach the same decision that O'Connor
did in Allegheny-that the religious display was unconstitutional.
O'Connor's admonition that the display of religious symbols in core
government buildings requires extra scrutiny74 also should have
provided further guidance. The Ten Commandments, as the Supreme
Court noted in Stone v. Graham,7 are unquestionably religious, and
the County courthouse is certainly a core government building. These
facts should have amounted to aper se violation of the Establishment
Clause under the endorsement analysis.
Instead, the court erroneously reached the opposite conclusion.
It failed to heed O'Connor's warning about the special risk of
displaying religious symbols in core government buildings. Even
more troubling is the court's failure to distinguish "history" and
"context" in the endorsement analysis. The Third Circuit repeatedly
stated that history provides a context that changes how the reasonable
observer would regard the plaque. The problem is that O'Connor
made clear that "the history and ubiquity of a practice is relevant
because it provides part of the context" 6 in which the reasonable
observer views the display. Thus, history is a part of context, but it
is not the end, or even the most important element of, the analysis.
However, the Third Circuit ended its analysis there. By confusing
"history" with "context," it failed to fully consider the factor that was
ultimately dispositive in both Lynch and Allegheny: the presence (or
lack thereof) of secular objects near the religious symbol which
lessened the sectarian nature of the display. The court should have
extended this analysis to its logical conclusion: because nothing in
the setting of the plaque detracted from its undeniably religious
nature, the plaque was unconstitutional.
The court's reliance on O'Connor's statement in Allegheny that
history can change the context in which the reasonable observer
views the challenged practice is also misplaced. O'Connor was
referring to practices which fit into the category of ceremonial
73. Id. at 264.
74. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 626, 109 S. Ct. 3086,
3119 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
75. 449 U.S. 39, 41, 101 S. Ct. 192, 194 (1980).
76. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630, 109 S. Ct. at 3121 (emphasis added).
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deism,7 such as having "In God we trust" on currency or opening
court with the phrase "God save this honorable court." These
phrases, through repetition, can be seen as having "lost their religious
significance. "  Even if one agrees with this assertion, the Ten
Commandments, however, are taken directly from Scripture and are
a religious text.79 The mere presence of the plaque on the courthouse
wall has in no way diminished the clearly religious nature of the Ten
Commandments. As a result, the "context" in which the reasonable
observer views the plaque does not change merely due to the passage
of time. If a plaque of the Ten Commandments is to withstand a
constitutional challenge, it must be surrounded by other secular
objects, similar to the creche in Lynch, which reduce the message of
government endorsement of religion that would be perceived by the
reasonable observer.
The court also failed to heed O'Connor's explicit warning against
using history in the manner which it did. In Allegheny, O'Connor
noted that historical acceptance of a practice does not guarantee its
constitutionality where the practice violates the values of the
Establishment Clause. 0 She also made clear that an inherently
religious symbol such as a creche can not be displayed on its own in
a government building without other secular items nearby to detract
from the symbol's religious nature. 8' Freethought presented a very
similar situation, with the major distinction being that the plaque
77. The phrase "ceremonial deism" was coined by former Yale Law School
Dean Walter Rostow in a 1962 lecture he delivered at Brown University. He
defined the term to encompass a "class of public activity, which ... could be
accepted as so conventional and uncontroversial as to be constitutional." Steven B.
Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 Colum. L. Rev.
2083, 2091 (1996).
78. For instance, in Lynch, Justice Brennan argued that the practices which
have been classified as ceremonial deism are "uniquely suited to serve such wholly
secular purposes as solemnizing public occasions, or inspiring commitment to meet
some national challenge in a manner that simply could not be fully served in our
culture if government were limited to purely nonreligious phrases." Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1382 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In Allegheny, the plurality considered the Court's invocation, the national motto,
and the Pledge of Allegiance as examples of ceremonial deism, "a form of
acknowledgment of religion that 'serves in the only way possible in our culture, the
legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence
in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in
society."' Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 596 n.46, 109 S. Ct. at 3101 n.46.
79. For a critique of the concept of ceremonial deism, see Epstein, supra note
77, at 2091 (arguing that almost every practice cited as an example of ceremonial
deism, such as the pledge, the national motto, and inaugural prayers cannot pass
constitutional muster when subjected to the endorsement test).
80. 492 U.S. at 630, 109 S. Ct. at 3121.
81. Id. at 626-27, 109 S. Ct. at3118-19.
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present in Freethought had been on the courthouse wall for a long
period of time. Given O'Connor's statement that historical
acceptance does not, on its own, validate such a practice, the
Freethought court should have reached a result consistent with
Allegheny.
2. The Court Erred by Assigning Unrealistic Knowledge to the
"Reasonable Observer"
The court's next error in applying the endorsement test was the
exceedingly unrealistic knowledge and impressions which they
attributed to O'Connor's reasonable observer. Given that the
Supreme Court has declared that the Ten Commandments are an
undeniably religious text,82 it follows that a reasonable observer
would also view the plaque in question that way. Instead, the court
stated that the reasonable observer would view the plaque "as a
reminder of past events in Chester County., 83 Remarkably, the court
provided absolutely no justification as to why a reasonable person,
faced with a plaque of the Ten Commandments, would view it not as
a religious document, but instead as a reminder of past events. The
court did not suggest what "past events" the reasonable observer
would associate with the plaque. It seems far more plausible that the
reasonable observer would associate the Ten Commandments with
the Bible, or religion in general. Such an impression would send the
message that the County endorses "religion over nonreligion, "84
which is constitutionally impermissible.85
The court also declared that a reasonable observer would view the
plaque's placement on the court's facade as being motivated by the
County's "desire to preserve a longstanding plaque., 86 Again, the
court provided no insight as to why the reasonable observer would
believe this.
82. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41, 101 S. Ct. 193, 194 (1980).
83. Freethought Society of Greater Philadelphia v. Chester County, 334 F.3d
247, 265 (2003).
84. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 89 S. Ct. 266, 270 (1968).
85. The specific version of the Ten Commandments which were posted also
undermines the County's argument that the display had a secular purpose. For
instance, after the First Commandment, the plaque included language such as, "For
I the Lord Thy God am a Jealous God, visiting the Iniquity of the Fathers upon the
Children unto the Third and Fourth Generation of Them that Hate me."
Freethought, 334 F.3d at 252. Since no civilized legal system permits punishing
persons other than those responsible for a crime, the County would seem to have no
argument that such principles are the foundation of American law. Furthermore,
there was testimony from one Jewish expert that this Protestant version of the Ten
Commandments would be objectionable to Jews. Id. at 253.
86. Id. at 251.
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Next, the court declared that the reasonable observer would
"know that the County has not held a ceremony to commemorate the
anniversary of the plaque, or even installed lights to draw attention to
the plaque at night." 1 7 This statement is remarkable for several
reasons. First, by assuming that the reasonable observer would know
that the County has never had a ceremony to celebrate the plaque, the
court charged the observer with knowledge of every event occurring
in Chester County since the installation of the plaque. While the
reasonable observer is required to have a general knowledge of the
history of the practice, the court here transforms the observer into an
all-knowing individual. Attributing such knowledge to the observer
is an obvious misapplication of the endorsement test.
Furthermore, the suggestion that the observer knows that the
County has not "installed lights to draw attention to the plaque at
night," is extremely unrealistic and misses the point of the
endorsement test entirely. Even if the reasonable observer knows
this, a religious document does not necessarily require spotlights to
create the impression that the government is endorsing religion. Use
of such attenuated and fact particular analysis suggests that the court
was starting from a premise of constitutionality.
B. The Court Did Not Fully Apply the Lemon Test
Another problem with the court's opinion is its failure to fully
apply the Lemon test. While the court did reach an acceptable answer
to the first prong of the inquiry (that the plaque was there to celebrate
the place of the Commandments in the development of the law), this
does not exhaust Lemon. After completing the first prong of Lemon,
the court was required to find that the principal or primary effect of
the challenged government action be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion and that there was no excessive government
entanglement with religion.88 Instead, the court decided that "since
effect under the Lemon test is cognate to endorsement," it would not
conduct analysis under the "purpose and effect prongs of Lemon. 89
Thus, the court completely ignored the final prong of excessive
government entanglement and did not directly address, using the
Lemon standard, the effect prong. The endorsement test requires a
different standard, i.e., that of the reasonable person, than Lemon for
determining the effect of the challenged display.9" The court avoided
the different question that Lemon raises: Does the plaque have the
87. Id. at 266.
88. 403 U.S. 602, 612-613, 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971).
89. 334 F.3d 247, 269 (2003).
90. 492 U.S. 573, 630, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3121 (1989).
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primary effect of advancing religion?9 1 Given the unquestionably
religious nature of the Ten Commandments and the lack of any
secular context to lessen the religious effect, the answer should have
been yes. Rather than address this difficult question, however, the
court unfortunately avoided it altogether.
C. The Court Overextended the Holding of Marsh v. Chambers
Rather than apply the contextual analysis required by the
endorsement test, the Court instead relied on Marsh v. Chambers, in
which the Supreme Court upheld legislative prayer as being
constitutional.' The Third Circuit felt that this case was significant
because it showed that "the Supreme Court has acknowledged the
proposition that history can transform the effect of religious
practice." 93
The difficulty with this assertion is that Marsh is inapplicable to
the facts at hand in Freethought. As E. Gregory Wallace has noted,
"Marsh is of little use unless the challenged practice has a history that
reaches back to the practices of the Founders." 94 Chester County
presented no evidence that the Ten Commandments were posted in
courtrooms when the Bill of Rights was drafted. Without that
established history, Marsh is inapplicable because the opinion does
not explain why the founders did not think legislative prayer violated
the Establishment Clause. Moreover, even assuming that such
evidence was available, the Supreme Court has warned that a broad
reading of Marsh would "gut the core of the Establishment Clause,"95
and that "Marsh plainly does not stand for the sweeping proposition
that all practices 200 years old and their equivalents are constitutional
today."
The other problem with Marsh is that it is an anomaly in the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In the period
leading up to the decision, the Court had analyzed Establishment
Clause cases by applying the Lemon test. Without explanation, the
Court in Marsh avoided the Lemon test altogether. Instead, the Court
held that the challenged practice of legislative prayer was "part of the
91. 403 U.S. 602, 612-613, 91 S. Ct 2105 (1971).
92. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 265-66 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983)).
93. Id. at 266.
94. E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks Religiously, 21 Fla. St. U.
L. Rev. 1183, 1215 (1994).
95. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 604, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3106
(1989).
96. Id. at 603, 109 S. Ct. at 3106.
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fabric of our society."97 This suggests that the Court considered
legislative prayer as an example of "ceremonial deism." Thus, Marsh
has limited precedential value because it is a serious deviation from
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. This was reinforced in
Allegheny when the plurality rejected Justice Kennedy's attempt to
broaden the holding of the case. 8 As a result, Marsh should only be
used to justify religious practices which were engaged in at the time
the Bill of Rights was written, and there is no evidence to suggest that
the posting of Ten Commandments in courtrooms was such a
practice. 99 Even in light of Marsh, the fact that the Framers believed
a practice to be constitutional should not end a modem inquiry into
the challenged practice's constitutionality. As Oliver Wendell
Holmes once noted, "[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a
rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It
is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past."' ° At the time of America's founding, nearly
one hundred percent of this nation's citizens were Christian, most of
whom were Protestant. 101 Today, however, Christians comprise less
than eighty percent of the American population. 2 As Stephen
Epstein has argued, "if there is to be freedom of religion in this
country today of the type that the Framers contemplated 220 years
ago, some practices that seemed perfectly permissible then cannot be
perfectly permissible now."' 3 Because America now consists of a
considerable number of people who believe in non-Christian
religions, or no religion at all, courts must reconsider the
constitutionality of religious displays which suggest that any one
religion is preferred by the government.
D. Comparison to Similar Cases in other Circuits
A comparison of the decision in Freethought to similar cases
decided in other circuits further reveals the Third Circuit's errors. As
mentioned in the introduction, Glassroth v. Moore was decided just
97. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3336 (1983).
98. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603, 109 S. Ct. at 3106.
99. Dustin Zander, Thou Shalt Not Post the Ten Commandments on the
Courtroom Wall: Judge Ray Moore and the Constitution, 9 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
371, 376 (1999).
100. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469
(1897).
101. Epstein, supra note 77 (citing Anson Phelps Stokes & Leo Pfeffer, Church
and State in the United States 39 (1964)).
102. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 2003, at 67 (2003).
103. Epstein, supra note 77, at 2158.
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days after Freethought, but held that the monument of the Ten
Commandments in question was unconstitutional."° The Eleventh
Circuit noted that the display of the Ten Commandments present in
Glassroth was not placed in any sort of secular context to reduce the
monument's religious significance.'° 5 It also fully applied the Lemon
test and found that the display failed the test's purpose and effect
prongs. 106
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Glassroth decision is
its rejection of the Marsh-based argument that Justice Moore
presented in defense of the monument. 07 Moore argued for a broad
reading of Marsh. 8 He contended that since there were some
acknowledgments of God at the time of the Founders, modem
acknowledgments like the monument should be tolerated as well.'0 9
However, the Eleventh Circuit noted that there was no evidence that
the Ten Commandments were placed in courthouses at the time the
Bill of Rights was proposed and adopted, and, as such, Marsh was
inapplicable." 0
In the Seventh Circuit case of Books v. City of Elkhart,"' the
court held that a large monument of the Ten Commandments
displayed in front of a local municipal building was
unconstitutional."' Using both the endorsement test and Lemon, the
court found that the monument had the effect of endorsing religion. 3
Again, the lack of a secular context was central to the court's
holding. 14
Finally, the Eighth Circuit held in Adland v. Russ that a
monument of the Ten Commandments donated by the Fraternal Order
of Eagles in 1971 could not be placed on the state capitol grounds." 5
The court determined that such a monument placed in public by the
government could not pass muster under the endorsement test."" The
Freethought court took note of the latter two cases, but distinguished
104. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (1lth Cir. 2003).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1296-97.
107. Id. at 1298 ("[t]hat there were some government acknowledgments of God
at the time of the country's founding and indeed are some today, however, does not
justify under the Establishment Clause a 5280-pound granite monument placed in




111. 235 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000).
112. Id. at 307.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 306 (noting that the monument in question stood alone).
115. Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002).
116. Id. at 489.
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them based on its flawed argument that history alone can change the
context in which a reasonable observer views the Ten
Commandments." 7
Thus, the Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have all issued
decisions which stand in contrast to the Third Circuit's opinion in
Freethought. Unlike the Third Circuit, the other circuit courts
properly considered the physical context in which the challenged
display appeared. Furthermore, the other circuits have refused to use
Marsh to circumvent the application of the contextual analysis
required by the endorsement test. The decisions of these circuit
courts provide further evidence that the Third Circuit erred in
Freethought.
IV. DE MINIMIS VIOLATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE?
While the Freethought court purported to rely solely on the
Lemon and endorsement tests, one could argue that there was another
underlying reason for its decision. Perhaps most revealing is the
court's decision to quote Justice Goldberg who stated that "the
measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability and willingness
to distinguish between real threat, and mere shadow."' 18 The Third
Circuit similarly noted that it believed that the plaque in question was
a "mere shadow" rather than a "real threat."' Ultimately, it appears
that the court believed that a plaque that did not offend anyone for
eighty years should simply be left alone. While it could not (without
considerable twisting and stretching) pass the tests which would make
it constitutional, the court upheld the display of the plaque anyway.
The court thus appears to invoke the legal maxim of "de minimis
non curat lex," or "the law does not concern itself with trifles."'
' 20
Indeed, Justice Brennan equated the "mere shadow" language of
Justice Goldberg with the maxim in his dissenting opinion in
Marsh.12' What is unclear is whether or not that doctrine should have
application in the context of the Establishment Clause. A brief
explanation of the maxim and its uses is appropriate before discussing
its desirability as a part of Establishment Clause analysis.
117. Freethought Society of Greater Philadelphia v. Chester County, 334 F.3d
247 (3d Cir. 2003).
118. Id. at 266 (citing Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,308,
83 S. Ct. 1560, 1616 (1963) (Goldberg, J.).
119. Id.
120. Jeff Nemerofsky, What is a "Trifle" Anyway?, 37 Gonz. L. Rev. 315, 316
(2002).
121. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 818, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3349 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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A. History of the Maxim
The legal maxim de minimis non curat lex has actually been
interpreted in numerous ways. A few examples include "[t]he law
does not care for trifles"; "the law does not concern itself with
trifles"; "equity will not concern itself with trifles"; "the law
disregards trifles"; and "the law cares not for small things.' ' 22 The
maxim has its roots in the English Court of Chancery, which
formulated a number of maxims to help steer its legal decision
making in resolving royal disputes. 23  These legal maxims are
generally referred to as "maxims of equity."'24 One of the most
frequently quoted statements on these maxims, by historian John
Norton Pomeroy, says, "They are not the practical and final doctrines
or rules which determine the equitable rights of individual persons.
. . [but] are rather the fruitful germs from which these doctrines and
rules have grown by a process of natural evolution.'
'1 5
The usual function of the maxim is to place "outside the scope of
legal relief the sorts of intangible injuries, normally small and
invariably difficult to measure, that must be accepted as the price of
living in society. ,126 The maxim signifies that "mere trifles and
technicalities must yield to practical common sense and substantial
justice," so as "to prevent expensive and mischievous litigation,
which can result in no real benefit to complainant, but which may
occasion delay and injury to other suitors.
The maxim has been used in a variety of contexts, including
contract, tort, civil, and criminal matters. 128 For instance, in Deutsch
v. United States,129 a prisoner alleged that a correctional officer
removed pens from Deutch's locker and did not return them. 130 He
sought four dollars and twenty cents in damages, which represented
the cost of the pens.' 3 ' The court held that the relief Deutsch sought
was a "trifle" and not worthy of adjudication. 32  Similarly, in
Schlictman v. New Jersey Highway Authority, ' 3 a motorist
122. Nemerofsky, supra note 120, at 316.
123. Idat 323.
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting 1 John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence
§ 361 (4th ed. 1918)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 325.
128. Id.
129. No. Civ. A. 95-1728, 1995 WL 136959 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff'd, 67 F.3d




133. 579 A.2d 1275 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990).
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complained that a roll of toll tokens he bought inadvertently contained
a slug and filed a lawsuit demanding twenty dollars and thirty-five cents
in damages. 131 The court found the claim to be "not meritorious," but
rather "vexatious and harassing." '135 It believed that "[t]he loss that the
plaintiff will have to bear as a result of the dismissal of this count is one
of any number of trifling inconveniences that we all commonly
. . .. "" S ,136
encounter in our daily lives.
The areas where the maxim should not be invoked are less clear.
The protection of an individual's constitutional rights is an area where
the courts disagree on the applicability of a de minimis exception. For
instance, in Lewis v. Woods,137 the court stated that "a violation of
constitutional rights is never de minimis.' 38 Continuing, the court noted
that "[b]y making deprivation of such [constitutional] rights actionable.
.. the law recognizes the importance to organized society that those
rights be scrupulously observed. 139  Other courts have been less
sweeping in their protection of rights from the de minimis doctrine. In
Pullman v. Dudley,14° the court stated that the de minimis doctrine is not
applicable "if a substantial right has been violated., 14 1 Thus, only
substantial rights would be protected.
B. The Use of the De Mvinimis Doctrine in Establishment and Free
Exercise Cases
The United States Supreme Court has yet to explicitly invoke de
minimis non curat lex to dispose of an Establishment Clause case.
However, it has used the principle that the maxim embodies to decide
cases, and individual justices have mentioned the maxim in various
opinions.
One could argue that the maxim is the basis for the Court's decision
in Marsh v. Chambers. The Court had been using the Lemon test for
over a decade when it abruptly abandoned it, claiming that the practice
of legislative prayer did not amount to a "real threat."" In his dissent,
Justice Brennan noted that "[s]imply put, the Court seems to regard
legislative prayer as at most a de minimis violation, somehow unworthy
of our attention."143
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1280.
136. Id. at 1280-81.
137. 848 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1988).
138. Id. at651.
139. Id.
140. 77 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
141. Id. at 595.




The Lynch opinion also implies the use of a de minimis exception.
Decided the term after Marsh, the Court engaged in a half-hearted
application of Lemon, only to eventually state that "any notion that
these symbols pose a real danger of establishment of a state church is
far-fetched indeed."' 44 Again, rather than subject the questioned
practice to the full scrutiny of the tests designed for determining the
constitutionality of such displays, the Court fell back on the idea that
the practice is not "a real threat." Such a position certainly invokes
at least the spirit of de minimis.
Perhaps the most telling reason why the Court has not yet
explicitly invoked the maxim is its unfortunate reluctance to handle
the cases in which the maxim would be most appropriate. Cases
addressing the constitutionality of the national motto and the
incantation of "God save the United States and this Honorable Court"
have been avoided. As Leonard Levy points out, those cases "should
be held unconstitutional as a matter of principle, although the rule de
minimis non curat lex might justify a more practical judgment."1 45
However, Levy notes that the Court has successfully avoided those
cases in order to avoid running afoul of public opinion.
46
V. THE DESIRABILITY OF A DE MINIMIS EXCEPTION
A. Arguments in Favor of a De Minimis Exception
Scholars disagree about desirability of creating a de minimis
exception to the Establishment Clause.147 One of the earliest and
most important Americans to consider the use of the maxim was
James Madison. 48 Madison felt that the Constitution "forbids
everything like an establishment of a national religion."' 149 He
considered chaplains for Congress, military and naval chaplains, and
presidential proclamations "recommending fasts and thanksgivings"
144. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1366 (1984).
145. Leonard W. Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First
Amendment 153-54 (1994).
146. Id.
147. For arguments in favor of a de minimis exception, see id., at 241 (arguing
that a de minimis exception is a common sense way to avoid having the public
discredit the Supreme Court) and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal
Democracy, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 195,207-08 n.59 (1992) (suggesting that challenges
to currency and other invocations of God should be dismissed as de minimis). For
an argument against, see Epstein, supra note 77, at 2168 (arguing that those in the
religious majority may favor a de minimis exception in order to ignore concerns of
religious minorities).




examples of "a national religion." 150 Rather than let these examples
exist as legitimate precedent, he favored the application of "the legal
aphorism of de minimis non curat lex. ' 15
1
One argument made in favor of a de minimis exception is closely
tied to the concept of ceremonial deism. The general idea is that
phrases like "under God," in the Pledge of Allegiance no longer have
religious significance. As one commentator noted, "we need not melt
down the national currency to get rid of 'In God We Trust.' Rote
recitation of God's name is easily distinguished as a de minimis
endorsement." '152 According to this line of thought, no reasonable
person could perceive such phrases as government endorsement of
religion.
Leonard Levy has argued that a de minimis exception would be
useful in protecting the credibility of the Supreme Court and, in turn,
the wall of separation between church and state. 53 He believes that
if the Court declared the pledge or national motto unconstitutional,
the public would "publically discredit" the Court and would be
tempted to "retaliate" against the wall of separation between church
and state. 4 He believes that rather than be offended by minor
references to religion or religious practice in public life, atheists and
others should "howl in glee at the corruption of religion by irreverent
ceremonial references to God," such as those in the Pledge or on our
money.15 5 Ultimately, he believes separationists should "let sleeping
dogmas lie. 1 56
The inclusion of a de minimis exception to the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence would provide the Court with a
logical and coherent way of dealing with the cases it has thus far
largely decided to avoid. Perhaps most importantly, it would allow
the Court to avoid more decisions like Marsh v. Chambers, which
completely ignore precedent and defy any sort of logical analysis in
their quest to reach a result which would not create public outcry.
Another rationale for a de minimis exception is that many
popular and traditional practices would be struck down if courts
were to apply the current Establishment Clause jurisprudence to
them. In his dissent in the highly controversial case dealing with
the Pledge of Allegiance, Newdow v. United States,'57 Judge
Fernandez of the Ninth Circuit feared that without recognition of
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Sullivan, supra note 147, at 207-08 n.59.




157. 328 F.3d 466 (2003).
[Vol. 65
the de minimis tendency of these practices to establish a religion in
the United States, "we will soon find ourselves prohibited from
using our album of patriotic songs" such as "God Bless America.,
15 8
He felt that the removal of these practices would "remov[e] a
vestige of the awe that all of us... must feel at the immenseness of
the universe. .... 1,,59 According to this line of thought, a de minimis
exception would protect these traditions from being declared
unconstitutional.
B. Why a De Minimis Exception Should Not Be Adopted
Despite these arguments, an exception to the Establishment
Clause based on the concept of de minimis non curat lex would be
improper. There are several persuasive arguments which support this
position.
Most proponents of the de minimis exception suggest it would
best be used in cases involving the pledge, the national motto, and the
like. The obvious problem with this is that these potential
Establishment Clause violations cannot be called "trivial." One need
look no further than the furious public reaction to Newdow than to
recognize that these are matters of significant importance. 6 ° To
suggest that a de minimis exception should be applied "ignores the
equally fervent views of those who would move heaven and earth to
keep those two words [under God] in the Pledge."'' A nation's
pledge of Allegiance is, to some degree, a reflection of the principles
and ideals of that nation. The answer to the question of whether or
not Congress may declare that our nation is one "under God" will
speak volumes as to the meaning of the Establishment Clause, as
would a ruling on whether or not a religious document such as the
Ten Commandments can be posted on a courthouse wall.
Furthermore, almost all of the practices which have formed the
subject matter of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence could be called "trifles." The creches in Lynch and
Allegheny did not likely signal an imminent theocracy in the United
States.'62 Similarly, the commencement prayer in Lee v. Weisman'
63
did not, as Judge Fernandez in Newdow noted, tend to establish a
158. Id. at 492.
159. Id. at 493.
160. Martin Kasindorf, Court Ruling on the Pledge Ignites Furor; Use of
'Under God' Unconstitutional, USA Today, June 27, 2002, at AOL.
161. Steven G. Gey, "Under God," The Pledge of Allegiance, and Other
Constitutional Trivia, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1865, 1914-15 (2003).
162. Id. at 1916.
163. 505 U.S. 577, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
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religion in the United States."6 But the important issue in both, as
Stephen G. Gey has noted, "was the combination of government with
religion that created the violation by shifting to the objector the onus
of avoiding the religious exercise." 165 Cases involving the Ten
Commandments, the pledge, and legislative prayer involve the same
combination. Thus, these cases fall within a long tradition of similar
challenges to the Establishment Clause, and unless the Court wishes
to get out of the business of determining the clause's meaning
altogether (as it understandably might), it should not create a de
minimis exception to avoid them.
As former Chief Justice John Marshall so famously stated in
Marbury v. Madison, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of
the of the judicial department to say what the law is.' 166 Those who
suggest that the Supreme Court utilize de minimis to protect the
credibility of the Court ignore this command and invite the judicial
branch to practice a dangerous jurisprudence of public sentiment.
Indeed, such a position conflicts with the intentions of the Framers.
Federal judges are given lifetime appointment under Article Ell of
the Constitution precisely because they are to be insulated from the
passions and politics of the majority. The Supreme Court must
sometimes make unpopular decisions when they are required by the
Constitution and to suggest that the Court should make decisions
based on their "credibility" in the eyes of the general public
degrades the entire judicial branch.
Another problem with creating a de minimis exception is that it
is not consistent with the purpose of the Bill of Rights. As the
Supreme Court noted in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 167
"the purpose behind the Bill of Rights... [is] to protect unpopular
individuals .. 1..,,168 The majority of Americans may well believe
that plaques of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and the
words "under God" in the pledge of allegiance are harmless. As a
result, courts may be tempted to declare suits which challenge these
perceived trifles as de minimis. Leonard Levy wisely notes,
however, that what is trifling to the majority may be threatening and
offensive, even persecuting, to a minority.'69 It is simply too easy
for the religious mainstream to argue that pledging allegiance to a
nation "under God" whose motto is "In God We Trust" creates only
164. Newdow v. United States, 328 F.3d 466, 492 (2003).
165. Gey, supra note 161, at 1903.
166. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
167. 514 U.S. 334, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
168. Id. at 357.
169. Levy, supra note 145, at 242.
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a de minimis Establishment Clause violation. 7 ° In cases such as
these, supporters of the de minimis doctrine seem to be telling
minority groups such as atheists and agnostics that their beliefs not
only do not deserve constitutional protection, but that they are not
even worthy of the court's time. Such a position is antithetical to
the principles of the Bill of Rights and to the sense of justice to
which our judicial system should aspire. As Arnold H. Loewy has
argued, "a society designed to accommodate cultural diversity
cannot afford to place a 'badge of inferiority' on some of its
citizens.' ' 71
Finally, using the maxim of de minimis non curat lex in
Establishment Clause cases could lead to a gradual, but steady
erosion of the wall of separation between church and state. As the
Supreme Court has stated, "The breach of neutrality that is today a
trickling stream may all to soon become a raging torrent.' ' 172 Court
decisions have shown a tendency to use an "any more than"
syllogism to uphold various religious practices. 173 For instance,
when Lynch was decided, the Court in part argued that the creche in
question was not "any more objectionable than" the practice of
legislative prayer which they had previously upheld in Marsh. If
continued, this type of thinking could lead to larger, more
substantial violations in the future. Thus, it is important to pull the
"weed out at its roots"'174 by refusing to allow de minimis violation
of the Establishment Clause.
CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit's decision in Freethought is troubling on
several levels. First, it misapplied the endorsement test, and then it
refused to completely apply Lemon. In an attempt to justify its use
of history to uphold the plaque, it overextended the limited holding
of Marsh v. Chambers. Finally, it declared the plaque to be only a
"mere shadow," rather than a real threat to the Establishment
Clause. By doing so, it applied the spirit of the legal maxim "de
minimis non curat lex." While some have argued that the maxim
should have a place in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
170. Epstein, supra note 77, at 2168.
171. Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion
Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's
Insight, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 1049, 1051 (1986).
172. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225, 83 S. Ct.
1560, 1573 (1963).




jurisprudence, its use would be in incongruous with the principles
behind the Bill of Rights. If Thomas Jefferson's famous wall of
separation of church and state is to remain standing, courts must be
vigilant in stopping even the smallest erosions of its foundation.
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